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ART. VI. *British and American Shipping.*

1. *The Merchant, Ship-Owner, and Ship-Master's Import and Export Guide.* By CHARLES POPE. London. 1828, 8vo. pp. 815. Fourteenth edition.
2. *Speech of Right Honorable William Huskisson in the House of Commons.* May, 1827.

We propose to devote a few pages to the consideration of the shipping and commerce of Great Britain and the United States. The importance of a flourishing commercial marine to the United States, with regard to national prosperity and individual wealth and comfort, is too clear to need explanation. It is likewise essential to our security against foreign aggression, the paramount interest of every nation; for it is necessary to the existence of a naval power, which can alone afford adequate protection to our commerce and our sea-coast. The first President Adams, one of the most early and zealous friends of the American Navy, remarks in one of his communications to Congress, that it was a commercial marine which had drawn to Europe the superfluous wealth of the other three quarters of the globe, and the superfluous wealth of Europe itself to two or three nations. His maxim was, that a commercial and a military marine must grow up together, and that one could not long exist without the other. This doctrine we believe to be true; notwithstanding the opposite opinion lately advanced in the *Edinburgh Review*, that commercial shipping is not at all essential to the existence and support of a powerful navy, and that England might be as formidable by sea as at present, or even much more so, without possessing a single merchant ship. We do not suppose that this theory is likely to gain many proselytes on either side of the Atlantic. England will never gratify her enemies or endanger her own security by an experiment to solve the question, whether the empire of the seas can be maintained without a commercial marine. In our own country, we trust, that whoever may be called to administer our public affairs, our commercial shipping will be cherished, not only as a most important branch of national industry and source of wealth, but as indispensably necessary to the existence and support of a navy, the right arm of our national defence, without which we can neither be secure at home nor assert our rights on the ocean.

Great Britain has realized in part at least, the splendid vision described by Bolingbroke in his idea of a Patriot King ; ‘of a people busy to improve their private property and the public stock, whose fleets cover the ocean, bringing wealth by the returns of industry, carrying assistance or terror abroad by the direction of wisdom, and asserting triumphantly the rights and the honor of Great Britain, as far as waters roll and as winds can waft them.’ The state of her shipping and commerce is a subject of peculiar interest to us, as American citizens, not only on account of Great Britain having been, ever since the decline of Holland, the first maritime power in the world, but because she is the nation with which our commercial intercourse is far more extensive than with any other, comprising about one third of our foreign trade and employing one third of our shipping. She is the only nation whose commercial marine is superior to ours, our only rival on the ocean, and the only power with which we can probably have any serious controversy. And though we may ardently wish that the two nations should, and have strong hopes that they will, pursue a friendly policy towards each other, and that their only rivalry will be in the arts of peace, it would be unwise to shut our eyes to the danger of a different state of things.

We propose to examine the condition of the shipping of England in the sixteenth century, and to trace its subsequent progress from that time to the present day.

In 1572, the merchant shipping of England was said to be one hundred and thirty-five vessels, some of them of five hundred tons.

The navy of Queen Elizabeth consisted of thirteen public ships of war ; the rest were borrowed from her subjects.

In 1588, the number of merchant ships was one hundred and fifty ; on an average, of one hundred and fifty tons each. The navy of the Queen, which encountered the Spanish *armada*, contained about forty public ships, and the rest were borrowed for the occasion from her subjects, in all the maritime towns which possessed any shipping.

Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1603, presented to King James an essay in manuscript, entitled, ‘Observations concerning the Trade and Commerce of England with the Dutch and other Foreign Nations.’ Its object was to show how England suffered the Dutch to carry away the trade of the world. Among other things he says, that ‘the Dutch, by the structure

or roominess of their shipping, holding much merchandise, though sailing with fewer hands than our ships, thereby carry their goods much cheaper to and from foreign ports than we can, whereby they gain all the foreign freights, while our ships lie still and decay, or go to Newcastle for coals.'

He speaks of the prodigious fishery of the Dutch, from which they get such vast returns yearly.

He says, 'that the Dutch and other petty States engross the transportation of the merchandise of France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, and the East and West Indies; all which they carry to Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and other northern ports, and bring back the products of those northern regions into the southern countries.'

'That the Dutch have a continual trade to this kingdom, with five or six hundred ships yearly, with merchandise of other countries, storing them up here till the price rise to their minds, and we trade not with fifty ships into their country in a year.'

He next mentions the great fishery of the Low Countries and other petty States, 'wherewith they serve themselves and all Christendom.' He estimates the value of the exports of this article, at £1,759,000 sterling, besides what were sent to the Straits.

He supposes that the Hollanders alone had about three thousand ships and fifty thousand men employed in the fisheries.

That the Dutch had five or six hundred ships in the timber trade, chiefly in the Baltic, and supplied themselves, England, and other parts of Europe, with this commodity.

That while England sends to the East countries of Europe but one hundred ships annually, the Low Countries send three thousand, and about two thousand ships yearly to France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

'That the Low countries have as many ships and vessels, as eleven kingdoms of Christendom have, let England be one, and that they build every year one thousand ships.'

This effort of the brave and unfortunate Raleigh, the first man of his age both as a statesman and warrior, to turn the eyes of James to the true interest of England, seems to have had no influence on the conduct of that weak and capricious monarch.

In 1651, Parliament passed the celebrated Navigation Act, for the advancement of the shipping, navigation, colonies and

plantations of England. They had observed with much concern, that the English merchants had usually freighted Dutch shipping for bringing home their own merchandise, because Dutch freights were lower than English. Dutch shipping was used for importing American products to England, while English ships were rotting in their harbors, and English mariners, for want of employment, went into the service of the Dutch.

Had the Parliament been governed by such maxims as are now taught by some of the political economists of England, they would have said, that it is better for the government to let things alone; that trade will regulate itself; that if English merchants in transporting their merchandise, gave preference to Dutch shipping, and English mariners there sought employment, it was plainly because it was the interest of the merchant and mariner to do so; that what is for the benefit of the individual, is for the good of the nation; and, therefore, that it was better for England that her merchants should transport their commodities, and her mariners seek employment in Dutch ships. No proposition in Euclid can be more clearly demonstrated than this, if the doctrines of some eminent political economists in Great Britain be admitted as correct.

By this act, no goods of any kind of the growth, production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America, could be imported into England, Ireland, or any of the plantations, except in British ships.

No goods of the growth, production, or manufacture of any country in Europe, could be imported into England or Ireland, except in English ships, or ships of the country where the goods were produced, or from which they could only be, or were most usually imported.

Goods of the growth of Russia, and also bulky articles, such as masts, timber or boards, foreign salt, hemp, flax, and a large number of articles called enumerated commodities, could be imported only in English ships, or in ships of the country of which they were the growth or produce, and these enumerated commodities could not be imported from Holland, the Netherlands, or Germany, in any ships, English or foreign, under any circumstances. Thus the Dutch, the great carriers for all Europe, were not only cut off from the carrying trade between England and the rest of Europe, but from almost all trade with England whatsoever.

Foreigners were excluded from the coasting trade of England

by direct prohibition, and from carrying thither the produce of any of the fisheries, by prohibitory duties.

This act was undoubtedly aimed against the commerce and naval power of the Dutch; this was probably the principal motive both with the republican parliament, by whom the act was first passed, and the parliament under Charles II. by whom it was re-enacted. The general object was to create a great commercial marine, and to prevent any other nation from obtaining any considerable portion of the carrying trade for England.

The extraordinary severity of the act, with regard to Holland, seems to have been intended to exclude the Dutch, so far as England could do it, from the commercial world. It was with a view to prevent any evasion of it by the Dutch, that the same prohibition was extended to the Netherlands and Germany. Foreigners were entirely excluded from any direct trade or correspondence with the British Colonies in America. Were it not for this, says Sir Josiah Child, we should see forty Dutch ships at our plantations for one English.

The navigation act has been highly extolled as the great foundation of the shipping, commerce, and naval power of Great Britain. Sir Josiah Child calls it the *Charta Maritima* of England, and asserts, that without it the English would not (in 1668) have owned one half the shipping or trade, nor have employed one half the number of seamen, which they did at that time.

Adam Smith says, that though some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from animosity, they are as wise as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom; not because they were favorable to commerce, but on account of their effect in diminishing the naval power of the Dutch, and increasing that of the English. Some writers were of a different opinion, and condemned the act; on the ground that instead of increasing English shipping and seamen, it had a tendency to diminish both. But until within a few years, most of the political writers of England, and all her statesmen, supported the measure as essential to the commercial and naval ascendancy of Great Britain. For nearly a century and a half, no minister would have ventured to propose any material change in it. So long as other nations acquiesced in it, and suffered Great Britain gradually to monopolize a great part of the commerce of the world, the act of navigation was almost

idolized. After the United States became independent, one of the first acts under the new constitution, was a navigation law for the encouragement of American shipping. This measure induced the British government to suspend the operation of their law with regard to the United States, in order to avoid losing the trade of this country. In 1815, the commercial intercourse between the United States and the British dominions in Europe, was placed on a footing of reciprocity.

The nations on the Continent now began to think of encouraging their own shipping ; and Great Britain was compelled to relax the regulations of this darling act, or lose, in a great measure, the trade of Continental Europe. We think, that if other nations had not opened their eyes to their own interest, and adopted measures to protect their shipping, and in retaliation of the act of navigation, Great Britain would not have discovered that it was a measure unwise as respected herself, and illiberal with regard to foreign nations. The retaliatory measures of Prussia produced this discovery ; and Great Britain, in 1823, adopted the system of reciprocity, and concluded treaties on this basis with Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and those States of Germany, which have any maritime commerce.

The benefits of this act may have been overrated by some of its zealous admirers ; but we can see no reason to doubt, that it had a great influence in promoting the navigation and trade of England, in strengthening her naval power, and giving her eventually the dominion of the seas. The repeal or modification of it became necessary when other nations began to perceive its injurious operation on themselves, and to adopt similar measures with respect to England, for the protection of their own navigation.

In 1701, the shipping of England consisted of two hundred and sixty-one thousand two hundred and twenty-two tons ; the number of seamen was twenty-seven thousand one hundred and ninety-six. This appears from the circular letter of the commissioner of the customs. The shipping of London was then eighty-four thousand eight hundred and eighty-two tons.

In 1753, British tonnage was estimated at three hundred and twenty thousand tons, which was probably below the real amount.

From the year 1760, the tonnage of Great Britain has been

ascertained by the Registry with considerable accuracy. We subjoin the tonnage at different periods.

In 1760,	486,740	In 1789,	1,390,823
1770,	682,811	1792,	1,540,149
1775,	697,304	1795,	1,574,451
1780,	618,853	1798,	1,666,481
1783,	669,802	1800,	1,855,879
1786,	932,018		

The most rapid increase was from the termination of the American war, in 1783, to the war of the French Revolution.

In six years, from 1783 to 1789, Great Britain more than doubled her shipping. In nine years, the increase was about 130 per cent. Never, in any period of her history, did she enjoy greater prosperity, or make more rapid advances in the arts of peace, than during the ten years after the American war.

The loss of her American Colonies, an event after which, in the opinion of Lord Chatham, the British crown would no longer be worth wearing, seemed, on the contrary, to augment the wealth and power of the empire.

The different result which followed the peace of 1815, after a war in which the triumphs of the British arms were without a parallel in her history, and which terminated in the humiliation of her great rival, and the enlargement of her own empire in each of the four quarters of the globe, affords a very curious and interesting subject of speculation.

Victory seems to have produced the consequences to be expected from defeat. Fifteen years of peace with all the world, instead of affording Great Britain any relief, seem only to have added to the suffering and discontent of her people, and to have brought her at length to the verge of a revolution, to prevent which was the great object of the war.

In considering the present amount of British shipping and commerce, and in comparing it with our own, it is necessary to attend to some circumstances, which, though they may seem obvious enough, have been strangely neglected or misunderstood by some men, both in Congress and out of it, who have undertaken to diffuse correct information, and to enlighten their fellow citizens on these subjects.

The actual tonnage and the tonnage-entries of vessels entering and departing, called the inward and outward tonnage, are

often confounded. Thus, the actual tonnage of the British empire in 1818, was two million four hundred and sixty thousand five hundred tons ; and in 1829, two million five hundred and eight thousand one hundred and ninety-one tons. As to this, there can be no mistake, as all the shipping is registered, and the registry carefully corrected yearly. This includes the tonnage employed both in the foreign and coasting trade in the British dominions in Europe, and the colonies and plantations in America.

The shipping owned by English subjects residing in India, and which is prohibited by law from going west of the Cape of Good Hope, is not included in the statement of the tonnage of the empire. The shipping of the East India Company is included, and forms a part of the tonnage of the port of London.

In 1800, the company's shipping amounted to one hundred and twenty-two ships, carrying one hundred and four thousand tons.

The shipping owned by individual British subjects trading to India, is, of course, also included.

The tonnage entries include the repeated voyages of every vessel, and therefore are no evidence of the amount of the actual tonnage.

In the foreign trade with France across the channel, where, as Mr. Huskisson says, many vessels come with one tide and return with the next, if a vessel of one hundred tons perform fifty voyages in a year from Dover to Calais and back, she would add five thousand tons to the inward and five thousand to the outward tonnage.

In the coasting trade, if a vessel of one hundred tons make twenty voyages between any two ports in England in a year, she adds two thousand tons to the inward tonnage of each port, and four thousand to the tonnage of the empire. In almost all the statements of British tonnage, both in the coasting and foreign trade, is intended not the actual tonnage, but the tonnage of vessels entering or departing, during the year, including their repeated voyages.

It might have been deemed unnecessary to make this explanation, had not a want of attention to these circumstances been the occasion of great errors and misrepresentations in this country.

Thus, in the speech now before us, the late Mr. Huskisson.

son says, that the British coasting trade amounted to 8,368,000 tons ; a statement which probably led our Committee of Commerce to suppose this to be the *actual* tonnage in the coasting trade, instead of the tonnage entries in that trade for the year ;— an amount of shipping more than three times greater than that of all the British empire, and probably more than all the shipping of Europe and America together.

Another circumstance to be attended to is the meaning of foreign trade, as used in statements of British commerce and navigation. In this country by foreign trade we mean a trade with foreign nations, or with the dominions of some foreign power. In England the meaning is much more comprehensive. Foreign trade includes not only the trade with foreign nations, but with their own possessions in Asia, Africa, and America, and even in Europe, as with Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark, Isle of Man, and Gibraltar. The trade to Ireland was foreign till 1823. When the British statements of their tonnage in foreign trade include Ireland, about two thirds of this tonnage are in the trade with their own dominions, and one third with foreign nations. When Ireland is omitted, about one half is with foreign nations, and the rest is with their own possessions in different parts of the globe, chiefly with the North American Colonies, and the East and West Indies.

One cause, which often produces erroneous ideas of the extent of British commerce, is the practice which is still retained of giving the official value of their imports and exports from the valuation of each article, made in 1697, when the office of Inspector-General was established. This subject has been explained in a late number of this Journal,* and we shall merely show the operation of this official value in one or two commodities in swelling the amount of British commerce.

Coffee is a considerable item in British trade. In the official value it is rated at fifteen pence sterling per pound. The quantity of coffee imported in 1829, is stated at 39,000,000 pounds, the official value of which is £2,502,000, or about \$12,000,000. This is three or four times its real value. The export was about 23,500,000 pounds, valued at £1,485,000, or about \$7,000,000.

The United States imported in the same year 51,000,000

* No. LXVI. page 192.

pounds, valued at \$4,588,000, and exported about 18,000,000 pounds, valued at \$1,536,000.

Cotton goods are estimated in the official value of exports in 1829, at about £34,000,000 sterling. The real value is about one half of that sum.

The whole amount of the exports of British produce and manufactures for the last year, according to the real and declared value, is stated at £35,212,000. The official value is about £20,000,000 more. The average of the real value for the last eight years, ending in 1830, is about £5,000,000 sterling a year less than that of the eight preceding years.

The following statement, we think, will be found to present an accurate view of the amount of British shipping, in different parts of the empire.

The actual tonnage of all the shipping in the British empire, both in the foreign and coasting trade, on the first day of January, 1828, was, by the British official statement, as follows ;

	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland . . .	19,032	2,150,505	130,494
Isles of Guernsey, Jersey, and Man	489	30,533	3,701
British plantations, including Brit- ish West Indies and possessions in North America . . .	3,625	279,362	17,220
Total tonnage of British empire	23,199	2,460,500	151,415

In 1829, the amount of British shipping was as follows ;

	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
Great Britain and Ireland . .	19,151	2,151,373	131,306
Guernsey, Jersey, and Man . .	495	31,927	3,763
British plantations, including foreign possessions	4,449	324,801	20,507
	24,095	2,508,191	155,576

The accuracy of the foregoing statements is the more to be relied on, as in 1827, the registry of the shipping was corrected, by requiring all vessels to be registered anew within a limited period, and many vessels supposed to be in existence, were found to be no longer so.

The average tonnage of each vessel in both foreign and coasting trade, is about one hundred and six tons, and about sixteen tons to one man.

The number of ships in 1826, above one hundred tons, was eight thousand seven hundred and fifteen, carrying one million nine hundred and six thousand eight hundred and eighty-six tons.

Let us now look at the amount of American tonnage ;

	Tons.
The whole tonnage of the United States, on the last day of December, 1828, was	1,741,391
Registered tonnage	812,619
Enrolled and licensed tonnage	928,772

Of the registered tonnage, fifty-four thousand, six hundred and twenty-one tons were employed in the whale fishery.

	Tons.
The enrolled tonnage in the coasting trade amounted to	787,224
Licensed vessels under twenty tons	55,680
The enrolled and licensed vessels in the fisheries, chiefly in the cod and mackerel fishery	85,867
Total,	928,771

Thus the shipping of the British empire is about two million five hundred thousand, and that of the United States upwards of one million seven hundred thousand, or somewhat more than two thirds the amount of the British shipping.

In our view of the trade between the United States and Great Britain, and the shipping employed to carry it on, we include our commercial intercourse with the whole of the British dominions. We take the year 1829, it being the last of which we have seen the official statement.

The exports from the United States to the dominions of Great Britain, in 1829, were	\$28,071,000
Imports	27,582,000
Exports in American vessels	\$20,826,000
“ in British	7,245,000

Total \$28,071,000

Exports in British vessels about twenty-six per cent.

Let us now look at the import trade for the same year.

Imports from dominions of Great Britain to the United States		
in 1829, in American vessels	.	\$24,466,000
In British	.	3,116,000

\$27,582,000

Imports in British vessels about thirteen per cent.

We come now to the shipping employed in this trade.

Amount of tonnage which entered the ports of the United States from the dominions of Great Britain in 1829,

American tonnage	.	307,996
British	.	86,377

Total 394,373

British tonnage about twenty-two per cent.

Export tonnage in 1829,

American	.	298,278
British	.	87,774

Total 386,052

British tonnage twenty-three per cent. nearly.

Thus it appears, that Great Britain has between one fourth and one fifth of the tonnage in her trade with the United States. The average for ten years past we believe to be not more than one fifth, including all the dominions of Great Britain.

The Convention between the United States and Great Britain, by which the equalization of the duties on tonnage and imports was extended to the vessels of both nations, so far as relates to the intercourse between the United States and the British dominions in Europe, was ratified in 1815, and has been in force ever since. The intercourse between the British European dominions and the United States, was now placed on the footing of equality. The competition was a fair one, and the nation whose ships could carry cheapest, would of course obtain the largest portion of the trade. We will state the tonnage in the trade with the British dominions in Europe, in 1816, the first year after the reciprocity treaty was in operation.

American tonnage	.	134,198
British	.	100,840

Or about forty-three per cent. of the whole.

In the trade between the United States and the whole of the British dominions, in 1816 ;

American tonnage	236,326
British	212,789
	449,115

British tonnage about forty-seven per cent.

In the trade between the United States and the British dominions in Europe in 1829, the shipping of each nation was as follows ;

Import Tonnage.

American	183,313
British	76,951
	260,264

Or about 29 6-10 per cent.

Export Tonnage.

American	198,066
British	70,921
	268,987

Or about 26½ per cent.

The average of British shipping in the trade between the United States and the British dominions in Europe for ten years past, we believe has not exceeded twenty-five per cent. of the whole.

In the year 1827, the ship-owners of London, and several other ports in Great Britain, being reduced, as they alleged, to great distress, presented their petitions to Parliament for relief. They ascribed the depressed condition of the British shipping interest to the changes in the system of navigation laws, introduced by Mr. Huskisson, and denounced these changes as giving to foreigners advantages which were driving British ships from the ocean. They stated, that foreign shipping in the trade with Great Britain was increasing, and must necessarily continue to increase, as the British ship-owner could neither build, nor navigate his vessels so cheap as foreigners, nor consequently carry freight at so low a rate ; and that the same prices for freights, which would produce nothing but loss to the British ship-owners, would yield to foreigners a moderate profit.

Gen. Gascoigne, the member from Liverpool, and colleague of Mr. Huskisson, moved that a select committee be appointed

to inquire into the present depressed state of the commercial shipping, and report thereon to the House. In his speech in support of the petitions, the General made certain statements, founded on documents furnished by the ship-owners, of the comparative prices of ship-building in England and foreign countries.

The prices stated were the following.

In London,	.	.	per ton.	£ 28
England on the average,			do.	18
Prussia,	.	.	do.	8 8s.
France,	.	.	do.	11
Sweden,	.	.	do.	6 15s.
Holland,	.	.	do.	10
Denmark,	.	.	do.	9 10s.
Russia,	.	.	do.	4 15s.

He stated, that seamen's wages were only half as much in these countries as in England; and that a Prussian vessel might be navigated four voyages, for about £389, while an English vessel of the same tonnage and with the same number of men, would cost not less than £664. That it was plain, therefore, that foreign ships could carry freights at a much lower rate than the English, and would of course have the preference, wherever they were permitted to be employed. That there had been a great depreciation in the value of British shipping. Ships in the port of Liverpool, which cost £14,000, were sold at £6,000; and of the new ships in the merchant service, nearly one third were built in Canada. These facts, and many others of a similar kind, tending to show the distress and decline of the British shipping interest, and the increase of foreign shipping in the trade with Great Britain, were stated by Gen. Gascoigne and Mr. Liddell, one of the members from Northumberland, and the petitioners, they said, were ready, if permitted, to prove their allegations by evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons.

To those who have observed with how much care the British Government have watched over the interest of their commercial shipping, and what jealousy they have displayed towards that of other nations, the reception which the petitioners met with from the House of Commons, must appear somewhat extraordinary. When the statements were made, which, if true, so deeply affected the interest of the ship-owners, and

consequently an important interest of the empire, and evidence was offered to support those statements, the natural and obvious course would have been, to give the petitioners an opportunity of proving their assertions, by referring the petition to a Committee of the House of Commons. If the allegations of the petitioners were true, they were entitled to relief. If they failed in supporting them, the House might be justified in declining to interfere in their behalf. At any rate, it might be thought, they were entitled to an inquiry. But the House of Commons were of a different opinion. Mr. Huskisson and his friend deemed it a safer course to make a stand in the outset, and resist all inquiry, than to give the ship-owners an opportunity of supporting their petition by evidence before a Committee, and the General's motion was negatived without a division.

Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Thompson declared the statements to be utterly erroneous, and said that nothing could be more extraordinary than the unblushing effrontery of the petitioners, who had supplied their advocates in the House of Commons with statements, which they must have known to be deceptive. Mr. Huskisson said, that the statements of the ship-owners were made in utter ignorance of the facts, or in positive defiance of them; and that they were founded on the supposition of an increase in foreign and decline in British shipping, whereas the very reverse was the case.

To charge a respectable body of men with ignorance, deception, and falsehood, on a subject with which it is supposed that they must be well acquainted, and at the same time to refuse them the opportunity, which they earnestly solicited, to prove the truth of their statements, does not seem to be altogether consistent with justice or decorum. Our object is not, however, to discuss the merits of the question as between the ship-owners and Mr. Huskisson, who, in vindication of himself, and in reply to the ship-owners, laid before the House several documents containing a great number of statements concerning the shipping and commerce of the British empire.

We do not find in the debate any denial of the principal causes of complaint, such as the fall in ships and freight, and the increase of foreign tonnage. But Mr. Huskisson said, that he had examined the subject in various ways; that in every way he looked at it, in whatever mode human ingenuity could be employed, the result would be, that British shipping would be

seen to possess very considerable advantages over the foreign. These statements and documents, from such a quarter, must be interesting to all, who wish to obtain an accurate knowledge of the commerce and navigation of the British empire. They are more worthy of our attention as citizens of the United States, because, as we think, they are the basis of all those unfounded representations, which have been made in this country, of the great magnitude and increase of the British, and decline of American shipping and commerce. We think, especially, that they are the ground-work of most of those ludicrous and unparalleled errors and exaggerations, which are contained in Mr. Cambreleng's report at the session of Congress of the last year, in respect to the amount and increase of British tonnage; though it must be confessed, that he has drawn many inferences concerning British shipping, and added many mistakes, which are peculiarly his own, concerning American shipping, for which Mr. Huskisson is in no wise responsible. We do not mean to say that the statements of Mr. Huskisson are not true in a certain sense, or that there is any intentional misrepresentation; but they do not contain the whole truth; and the subject is presented in such parts and divisions, exhibited in such lights, and stated in such language, as almost necessarily to convey very erroneous impressions to those who do not carefully examine for themselves.

Thus Mr. Huskisson, to prove the increase of British shipping in foreign trade, says, that in the trade with all parts of the world, *strictly foreign*, out of Europe, the amount of *British tonnage* employed in 1814, was five hundred and thirty-five thousand tons. In 1826, it was eight hundred and seventy-eight thousand, being an increase of three eighths, while with the single exception of the United States, the foreign shipping in that trade was greater in any one of the six years preceding 1826, than it was in that year.

On examining the documents, we find that seven eighths of this tonnage in the strictly foreign trade of Mr. Huskisson, consist of the trade of the British dominions out of Europe.

The inward tonnage in this trade from all parts of the world out of Europe, is stated in the documents at nine hundred and seventy-five thousand six hundred and twelve tons.

It includes the tonnage in the trade with Canada and Nova	
Scotia, ...	472,588 tons.
British West Indies, ...	243,448
British East Indies, ...	72,457
British possessions on the Western Coast of	
Africa, including the Cape of Good Hope, ...	32,044
Whale fisheries, ...	40,532
	860,005

From 975,612 tons
Deduct 860,005

115,607

So that of Mr. Huskisson's strictly foreign trade out of Europe, only one hundred and fifteen thousand six hundred and seven tons, are employed in the trade with foreign nations. The rest of the tonnage is in the trade with their own possessions, a trade under their control, and from which foreigners are entirely excluded. Nearly one half of it is employed in the trade with the Northern Colonies, chiefly in carrying lumber, and is of no more importance than our own coasting trade, in that commodity.

Mr. Huskisson says, that with the single exception of the United States, the foreign shipping in the trade out of Europe had diminished. The exception is a most important one. Take away the United States, and what nation out of Europe has any shipping worth notice, to carry on a foreign trade in competition with Great Britain? No one could suppose that the British trade with China, Mexico and the South American States, could be carried on otherwise than in British shipping.

Mr. Huskisson says, that the trade with the North American colonies had increased in a gigantic degree since the peace of 1815, from one hundred and fifty-one thousand to three hundred and ninety-seven thousand tons, export tonnage.

It is true that there has been a great increase of shipping in the colonies, but this is in a great measure the consequence of a preference given to the timber of the colonies, notwithstanding its inferior quality, to that of the North of Europe, by the imposition of heavy duties on the latter. This very system, which has produced a great increase in the trade and shipping of the colonies, is one of restriction, and is denounced in the *Edinburgh Review*, as a regulation, which costs the country an-

nually about a million sterling, and the impolicy and absurdity of which cannot be exceeded, by any thing in the policy of old Spain. 'It is ridiculous for us,' says the Review, 'while the foreigner can lay his finger on such a table of duties as this, to boast of our liberal commercial policy.'

The increase, however, is not equal to the decline of British shipping in Europe.

The complaints of the ship-owners do not seem to have been fairly met by Mr. Huskisson. They complain that by a repeal of the navigation laws, and the abolition of discriminating duties on ships and goods in treaties with the United States, with Prussia and other northern powers of Europe, there had been an increase of foreign and decline of British shipping.

Before the repeal, Great Britain had about two thirds of the shipping in the trade with Prussia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Germany, and after the repeal, less than one half. There had been a decline of British shipping in the trade with the United States. It is also true, that there had been a decline in the actual tonnage of the British empire since the peace; and the decline in the tonnage of the British dominions in Europe, according to the British official statements, amounted to about two hundred thousand tons.

Mr. Huskisson admits none of these facts, but by statements of tonnage entries, in which foreign and coasting trade are mingled together, and the trade with the British dominions considered as foreign trade, attempts to prove, that there had been an increase in the tonnage entries. But he gives no separate statement of the British and foreign tonnage in the trade with those countries with which the reciprocity treaties complained of, had been concluded. The tonnage in foreign trade is swelled to about three times the amount of the tonnage in the trade with foreign nations.

We by no means intend to assert, that the reciprocity act, as it is termed, or the reciprocity treaties, were on the whole injurious to the interests of Great Britain, or that Mr. Huskisson did not judge wisely with regard to the repeal of the navigation act.

As to the policy of these measures, there is a great diversity of opinion in England, and it is a question for that nation to determine. But it appears from the official statements of the British government, that since the repeal there has been an actual diminution of the tonnage of the empire, and the decline

has been in the shipping of the British dominions in Europe, to which the operation of this policy has been chiefly confined, and that there has been a considerable increase of foreign tonnage.

But Great Britain has other interests besides those of navigation. The North of Europe is a great market for British manufactures; and rather than lose or diminish this vent for her goods, she chose to admit the vessels of the Northern powers into her ports on terms of reciprocity. She deemed it better that her manufactures should be carried thither in foreign vessels, than to run the risk of being, by prohibitory duties, excluded altogether.

The rapid increase of American shipping and commerce, from 1790 to 1810, may be ascribed not only to the enterprise of our merchants, and the activity and skill of our mariners, but in a considerable degree to the encouragement afforded by our navigation act and to the wars which grew out of the French revolution. During this period, the commerce of Continental Europe was in a great measure swept from the ocean, and Great Britain and the United States became the carriers for the commercial world. Our tonnage in twenty years rose from 450,000 to 1,400,000 tons.

In 1802, Great Britain having manifested a disposition to abolish the discriminating duties on tonnage and imports, with respect to American vessels, provided the United States would adopt a similar measure with regard to British vessels and their cargoes, the question was brought before Congress; a committee to whom the subject was referred were in favor of doing this, but in consequence of remonstrances from all our principal commercial towns against any change in our navigation laws, the project was abandoned. In 1815, the reciprocity convention now in force was concluded.

This measure was an experiment on our part. Serious doubts were entertained whether we could build and navigate ships at so cheap a rate as the English. The experiment has, we think, been a successful one.

Since it has been in operation, three fourths or more of the trade between the two countries has been carried on in American vessels.

In our commercial intercourse with all other nations, there can be no doubt, that the reciprocity system in respect to duties on vessels and merchandise, is very advantageous to the

United States, as almost all the trade is carried on in American shipping. It is therefore highly desirable, that our vessels should be admitted into the ports of other nations on the same terms as their own.

So long as we continue the reciprocity system, we have no reason to expect that a greater proportion of our foreign trade will be carried on in American vessels than the average for fifteen years past. The proportion of American tonnage has varied from about seven eighths to nine tenths.

The average of the whole tonnage in our foreign trade for several years past, has been about one million tons. In 1829, the American tonnage entering our ports, was eight hundred and seventy-two thousand nine hundred and forty-nine tons, and the outward tonnage nine hundred and forty-four thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine. The foreign tonnage entering the same year was one hundred and thirty thousand seven hundred and forty-three, and the outward was one hundred and thirty-three thousand and six.

The average of the tonnage in the trade of Great Britain with foreign nations is about one million five hundred thousand tons, of which about three-fifths are British.

The British inward tonnage in this trade in 1826, was nine hundred and thirty-four thousand tons, and the foreign six hundred and forty-three thousand.

The outward tonnage was eight hundred and eighty-three thousand British, and six hundred and ninety-two thousand foreign.

In the whale fishery, the superior activity, enterprise and skill of American seamen, have been eminently conspicuous. The late war put a stop to this business, and occasioned great loss to those engaged in it. When peace came, our bold and hardy whalers resumed their occupation. In 1828, the tonnage in the whale fishery did not probably exceed twenty thousand tons; as Nantucket and New Bedford, the places to which the business was chiefly confined, had but about seventeen thousand tons. Twenty-four whale ships were taken by the enemy during the war. Since that time, the fishery has been prosecuted with great success, and the tonnage engaged in it has increased to a surprising degree. In 1828, it was fifty-four thousand tons, and at present we believe the whole of our tonnage in the whale fishery to be not less than eighty thousand tons. The following statement is taken from a New Bedford paper, and we have been assured of its correctness.

‘The number of foreign clearances at the port of New-Bedford the last year, was one hundred and one, and of foreign entries eighty-three. Of the arrivals, fifty-eight were from whaling voyages, importing forty-one thousand one hundred and forty-four barrels of spermaceti oil, fifty-three thousand one hundred and forty-five barrels of whale oil, and three hundred and eighty-one thousand pounds of whalebone. There remained at sea, on whaling voyages, at the end of the year, one hundred ships, nine barques, and seven brigs, measuring thirty-five thousand two hundred and eight tons, and navigated by two thousand six hundred and thirty-five men. Of these vessels, fifty-six are in the Pacific Ocean, and the rest on the Brazil Banks, in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. The whole tonnage of the district is fifty-five thousand five hundred and eighty-eight tons.’

In 1828, the shipping of this port in the whale fishery was short of twenty-six thousand tons. If Nantucket and other ports from which it is carried on have increased in proportion, the whole tonnage will not fall short of our estimate.

The whole produce of this fishery for the year 1830, must, we think, exceed three millions of dollars.

The English have never been so successful in this branch of industry as the Dutch were formerly, or the people of New England have been for many years. About three fourths of the British whale ships are in the Greenland, and the rest in the South Sea fishery.

The decline in this branch of their navigation has been almost as rapid as its advance with us. The number of whale ships cleared from the ports of Great Britain in 1820 was two hundred and ten, making sixty-four thousand eight hundred tons, and in 1826 the number cleared was one hundred and twenty-eight, amounting to forty thousand five hundred tons. The tonnage entered had fallen off in ten years, ending in 1828, from sixty thousand to thirty-four thousand tons. On this subject, the eulogy of Burke on the people of New England, as surpassing all their competitors in this perilous industry, will occur to the reader.

We intended to go more fully into the subject of our commerce and shipping; but we have already exceeded the limits prescribed, and probably exhausted the patience of our readers. The result of our investigation is a full confidence that there are no well founded reasons for apprehending any decline of our shipping or commerce. From whatever point of view we look at these interests, we are convinced, that our merchants,

ship-owners, and mariners, have reason to be of good cheer. If we look back for ten or twelve years, we find a steady increase in our shipping, as rapid as could be expected, or perhaps, as we ought to wish. The increase in our registered tonnage in that time has been about two hundred thousand tons; and taking into view the different mode of building ships, which has been common for a few years past, the real increase is considerably more. Our coasting tonnage has increased in a still greater degree. A much larger proportion of our foreign trade is carried on in our own ships, than is the case with any other nation.

There has indeed of late been some depression in the shipping interest; but we do not know that it has been greater than that which has affected other branches of industry; and from all the information obtained from England and the rest of Europe, we believe the depression has been much greater in that quarter than with us. For some time past, there has been an evident improvement in the prices of ships and freight, and the prospects of the shipping interest, as well as of other interests, have been gradually brightening. We see no reason why our foreign and carrying trade may not continue to flourish. We believe that other nations have, on the whole, no advantages over us either in building or navigating ships; but that in several important particulars, and especially in the skill and activity of our seamen, we have considerable advantages over them. This is abundantly evident wherever our countrymen can come in competition with foreigners on equal terms, as in the fisheries, in our foreign trade, and in the carrying trade, by which we supply the Continent of Europe with so great a portion of the commodities of the East and West Indies.

Our shipping is now relieved from the tonnage duties; and if any farther facilities can be granted, sound policy would seem to require them. In a time of general peace in Europe, we cannot indeed expect, that our navigation in foreign trade should go on increasing with so much rapidity as during the war of the French Revolution, when we were the only neutral nation having much shipping, and thus became in a great measure the carriers for the Continent of Europe.

As to our home trade, its importance becomes every day more apparent, and great as its increase has been in time past, its future progress will in all probability be still more rapid. When we consider the extent of our territory, the abundance

and variety of its productions, the growth of our manufactures, the mutual wants and dependencies of the different parts of our Union, together with the facilities for water communication, and our population, increasing in a ratio without a parallel in the annals of nations; the imagination can hardly set any bounds to the extent of the future commercial intercourse between these States, or the amount of shipping of all kinds, that will be required on our sea-coast, rivers and lakes.

It has been remarked of the shipping interest, that it is the ally of all other interests in the community, and the enemy of none. It is a good customer to all other branches of industry, without being the rival of any. To agriculture, commerce and manufactures, it is a common friend and benefactor.

We have omitted till now, according to a liberty not uncommon with reviewers, any mention of Mr. Pope's work on the shipping and commerce of the British empire. Mr. Pope has comprised in this volume a great mass of information, that must be very valuable to those whose occupations are at all connected with maritime commerce. We know of no work that can supply its place; and the circumstance of its having reached the fourteenth edition in a few years, is a proof of its favorable reception among the merchants and ship-owners of Great Britain. On comparing it with a former edition, we find a considerable change for the better, both in the selection of materials and their arrangement, though we think there is still no small room for improvement in both these particulars.

ART. VII.—*The Art of Preserving Beauty.*

L'Art de conserver et d'augmenter la Beauté. Par L'AMT.
12mo. Paris. 1829.

Lady Mary Wortley Montague affirms in one of her letters, written at the latter part of her life, that she had not cast her eyes upon a looking-glass for twelve years; a striking proof how disagreeable it was to her, to be reminded of the changes which time had wrought in her outward appearance. With all her wit, talent, and strong good sense, she took the matter so much to heart, that it appears to have poisoned the sources of her happiness, and was probably the real cause that induced her to leave England, where she might have lived at peace in the bosom of her family, and drag out a wretched existence,